ABSTRACT With outsourcing huge amount of images to cloud, it can reduce the local storage and computational overhead of resource-limited users, but the security concerns still impede the adoption of outsourced image processing services. Fortunately, image processing in the encrypted domain can handle this problem very well and has already attracted considerable attention due to its ability to protect valuable image information from being leaked to untrusted parties. However, the existing schemes incur high computational complexity, and none of them can be used as both global feature and local feature. To this end, we present a method to implement Hahn moments in the encrypted domain by using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) in this paper, named Privacy-Preserving Hahn Moments (PPHM). First, a mathematical framework is proposed to implement the PPHM and image reconstruction in the encrypted domain. Then, the detailed theoretical analysis about data expansion and quantization errors shows that plaintext Hahn moments and plaintext image reconstruction can be implemented by utilizing PPHM over encrypted image. Moreover, security analysis shows that the PPHM can guarantee the image content security. Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the PPHM scheme can greatly reduce the computational complexity compared with the discrete cosine transform and the discrete wavelet transform in the encrypted domain. In addition, experimental results show that the PPHM has a better performance in both image reconstruction and image recognition. Furthermore, the suitable value of a scaling factor, which can provide guidance to users, is specified for image reconstruction and image recognition, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of cloud computing, users perfer to outsource their huge amounts of image data to remote cloud so that they can reduce the image storage and computational burden locally. However, image outsourcing still incurs data security and privacy concerns as the semi-trusted cloud is usually provided by the third-parties. Fortunately, the combination of image processing in the encrypted domain [1] and suitable cryptographic protocols [2] , [3] can effectively solve above problems. In this case, image owners can simply send their encrypted images to remote cloud server and then perform corresponding image processing in the encrypted domain.
However, the most common cryptosystems, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), do not keep the algebraic structure after plaintext encryption. Moreover, it becomes extremely difficult to perform meaningful calculations over the encrypted data. Fortunately, homomorphic cryptosystems can preserve algebraic relations of plaintexts after encryption, which has been a promising solution in secure image processing fields. Specifically, homomorphic encryption [4] , [5] is a form of encryption that allows a function to be computed on ciphertexts without decryption.
For the last several years, researchers have made some achievements in the field of image processing in the encrypted domain. The existing work mainly uses local features, such as Scale Invariant Features Transform (SIFT) [6] - [8] , Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) [9] , and Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) [10] , [11] . However, these local features have the disadvantages of high dimension and computational complexity. The problems in image processing applications are shown in Fig. 1 . Compared to the aforementioned local features, the discrete orthogonal Hahn moments have the advantages of simple computations, less sensitive to noise and excellent image reconstruction capability due to the orthogonality of the Hahn polynomials, and have been widely used in digital image analysis [12] , [13] and pattern recognition tasks [14] . In addition, different from other methods (e.g., SIFT, SURF, HOG, Chebyshev moments, Krawtchouk moments, Charlier moments, etc.), Hahn moments can be used as both global feature extraction mode and local feature extraction mode, which have better performance than using local or global feature, respectively [15] . Furthermore, Hahn moments can be simply implemented in the encrypted domain since the calculation of Hahn moment only involves addition and multiplication operations. In light of the aforementioned advantages, we present a method to implement Hahn moments in the encrypted domain by using SHE scheme, named PrivacyPreserving Hahn Moments (PPHM).
To apply the Hahn moments in the image processing in the encrypted domain, we propose PPHM scheme which can avoid the interaction between users and cloud. As a summary, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) A mathematical framework is proposed to implement PPHM by using SHE scheme. Compared with plaintext Hahn moments, PPHM will expand the plaintext value of the orthogonal base function, thereby deducing an upper bound of Hahn moments so that the correct plaintext Hahn moments can be obtained after decryption. 2) Security analysis shows the PPHM can guarantee the image content security. Theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that PPHM scheme can greatly reduce the computational complexity compared with DCT and DWT in the encrypted domain. 3) Image reconstruction experiment is presented. The experiment results demonstrate that PPHM can be used as a global feature as well as a local feature for the encrypted image. Moreover, there is no communication between the image owner and the cloud server except uploading image and receiving results. 4) The object recognition experiment is provided to evaluate the discriminative capability of the PPHM. Experimental results show that the PPHM and the Hahn moments almost have the same performance. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives related work. Section III provides some preliminaries. Section IV describes system model and security goals. Section V introduces the framework of implementing PPHM, and the detailed analysis of data expansion and quantization errors is discussed. Section VI presents the implementation of image reconstruction in the encrypted domain. Section VII gives a theoretical analysis including the computational complexity and security of PPHM scheme. Section VIII presents the experimental results to evaluate the performance of PPHM. Finally, Section IX concludes the whole paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, researchers have made some related achievements in the field of image processing in the encrypted domain. These works can be roughly categorized into two types.
One category focused on the local feature extraction in the encrypted domain. Hsu et al. [6] , [7] first studied the privacy-preserving SIFT descriptors in the encrypted domain produced by Paillier cryptosystem [16] . However, the schemes [6] , [7] were computationally inadmissible and insecure from the privacy perspective [17] . To this end, Wang et al. [8] proposed a scheme by using garbled circuits [18] to extract privacy-preserving SIFT from the encrypted domain, while this scheme was ineffective in practical applications due to high communication costs between one cloud and the other cloud. In order to further reduce computation and communication costs, Hu et al. [19] presented a scheme to achieve privacy-preserving outsourcing computation of SIFT. Although this scheme uses SHE to design two efficient protocols for security multiplication and comparison, the huge number of multiplications and multiple round comparisons in the calculation of SIFT result in expensive costs. In addition, Bai et al. [9] proposed a scheme to achieve privacy-preserving SURF feature extraction, but this scheme could not support off-line operation, and required a frequent interactive communication between the user and the server [20] .
The other category mainly paid attention to the implementations of the fundamental transforms in the homomorphic encrypted domain. Zheng and Huang [21] , [22] proposed DWT and Walsh-Hadamard transform [23] by using the paillier cryptosystem [16] . Bianchi et al. [24] proposed DCT by utilizing the paillier cryptosystem [16] . However, the aforementioned schemes were more time-consuming owing to the usage of paillier cryptosystem [16] .
In a nutshell, existing schemes either incur high computational burden or cannot guarantee a higher level of security. Unlike the existing schemes, PPHM is more efficient since PPHM only involves a small number of modular addition and modular multiplication operations.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Before elaborating PPHM scheme, we will first give a brief overview about the SHE algorithm for constructing PPHM. Then we discuss the discrete orthogonal Hahn moments.
A. SOMEWHAT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
In this paper, we adopt Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) scheme [25] to achieve more efficient ciphertext operations. In the following, we simply introduce the SHE scheme [25] .
We consider a ring R q = Z q [x] x n + 1 , where q is a prime, n is a power of 2, and the error parameter σ is the standard deviation defined in the discrete Gaussian error distribution χ = D Z n ,σ . The message space of the SHE scheme is defined as R t = Z t [x] x n + 1 , where t < q.
• SH.Keygen(1 k ): Sample a ring element s $ ← − χ , an error e ← χ , a uniformly random ring element a 1 ← R q , and then define the secret key sk = s, the public key pk = (a 0 = − (a 1 s + te) , a 1 ).
• SH.Enc(pk, m): Given the public key pk = (a 0 , a 1 ) and a message m ∈ R q , the encryption algorithm picks u ← χ, f , g ← χ, and the ciphertext can be calculated with Eq.(1).
• SH.Dec(sk, ct = (c 0 , c 1 , ..., c δ )): To decrypt ct, SHE scheme first computes
and then the message can be calculated with Eq.(3).
In the following, we will show how to compute the addition and multiplication operations homomorphically.
• SH.Add. Let ct = (c 0 , c 1 ) and ct = (c 0 , c 1 ) be the two ciphertexts, we can have
• SH.Mult. Let ct = (c 0 , c 1 , ...c δ ) and ct = (c 0 , c 1 , ..., c γ ) be the two ciphertexts, v be a symbolic variable, we can gain the expression
The output is
B. DISCRETE ORTHOGONAL HAHN MOMENTS
In this section, we will briefly review the algorithm about Hahn moments [12] , which will be used to construct PPHM in order to process the encrypted image. To be specific, Hahn moments are based on a set of discrete orthogonal Hahn polynomials which act as basic function set, and the basis function is a set of orthogonal polynomials associated with the binomial distribution. The Hahn moment of order (n + m) is defined in the Cartesian coordinate with Eq.(7) [12] .
where
, represent orders of the Hahn moments, and h n (x; α, β, N ) which denotes the weighted Hahn polynomial of n order is defined with Eq. (8) .
, and h n (x; α, β, N ) represents the n-th order Hahn polynomial is defined with Eq. (9) .
is the hypergeometric function, which is defined by Eq.(10).
where (a) k is the Pochhammer symbol given by
The weighted Hahn polynomials satisfy a three-term recurrence relation in Eq. (12) .
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and the two initial values are h 0 (x; α, β, N ) =
If all of the Hahn moments up to a given order are computed, then the discrete image can be estimated by using Eq. (14) . (14) where
. Furthermore, Eq. (15) shows that the image can be reconstructed without any error from the entire set of Hahn moments on condition that
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT: SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS A. SYSTEM MODEL In our system, we mainly consider the following application scenarios: a resource-constrained image owner (IO) who has large-scale image data (e.g., medical images, face images, etc.) and wants to perform image reconstruction task and object recognition task, IO may be more inclined to outsource huge amounts of image data and feature extraction operations to a resource-abundant cloud server (CS) to reduce the image storage management and computation burden locally. Figure. 2 shows the system model of our PPHM scheme. Next, we expatiate on the specific steps of the system model. 6 : IO can recover the reconstructed image plaintext by using the secret key sk in some applications (e.g., image watermarking, image compression, etc.).
B. SECURITY GOALS
In our security model, we assume that CS is ''honest-butcurious'' . This means that CS will dutifully execute assigned PPHM scheme on the encrypted image, but CS will be interested in learning sensitive information from encrypted image data and all the intermediate results during the execution of PPHM scheme. Thus, we have the following goals:
1) Confidentiality of image pixel values. The PPHM should use effective mechanisms to ensure that CS cannot obtain any image pixel values during the execution of PPHM scheme. 2) Privacy of image content. To design reasonable scheme, it requires that CS cannot obtain any relationship between the value of two pixels.
Note that we claim that the encrypted image will not be tampered with by CS.
V. PPHM: HAHN MOMENTS IN THE ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
In this section, Hahn moments in the encrypted domain will be described, named Privacy-Preserving Hahn Moments (PPHM). Since both the plaintext and ciphertext in the SHE are confined to integers, all the parameters about Hahn moments must be converted into integers with a quantization process.
A. INTEGER APPROXIMATION AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING HAHN MOMENTS
It is well known that all the pixels of the input image are integers in the range [0, 255], but the weighted Hahn polynomials h n (x; α 1 , β 1 , X − 1) and h m (y; α 2 , β 2 , Y − 1) in Eq. (7) are real numbers. Thus, h n (x; α 1 , β 1 , X − 1) and h m (y; α 2 , β 2 , Y − 1) should be converted into integers by the aid of a quantization process which can be defined with Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) . (17) where · represents the rounding function, and Q denotes a suitable scaling factor associated with the precision of the Hahn moments in practical application. For convenience, we omit the subscript (x; α 1 , β 1 , X − 1) and (y; α 2 , β 2 , Y − 1) .
According to the above analysis, the Hahn moment of order (n + m) for a digital image f (x, y) function can be approximately calculated with Eq. (18) .
Since all the operations in Eq. (18) are conducted in integer field, such as integer multiplication and integer addition, based on Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), PPHM of order (n + m) can be obtained with Eq. (19) .
In Figure. 3, we show the process of the (n + m)-th order PPHM implementation. It should be explicitly stated that we encrypt h n h m as a whole to reduce the number of multiplication operations in the encrypted domain and improve the efficiency of the scheme. 
B. EXPANDING FACTOR AND UPPER BOUND
Before calculating the PPHM by utilizing Eq.(19), we need to solve two problems. The first one is whether we have the possibility to recover H nm correctly by performing D E H nm . In other words, we must ensure that there is a one-to-one mapping between H nm and H nm mod t in Eq. (19) . The second one is how we can get the plaintext Hahn moments H nm by using H nm when given correct H nm .
For one thing, a solution is to obtain an upper bound U H of the H nm to get the correct result of the D E H nm . Since H nm could be a negative number, the upper bound U H must satisfy the condition U H ≤ (t − 1)/2 so that the correct H nm can be obtained by using Eq. (20) . For another, there will be a scaling factor S between H nm and H nm because of the quantization of the weighted Hahn polynomials. The plaintext Hahn moments H nm can be obtained with H nm = H nm /S. Consequently, the study of the scaling factor S and the upper bound U H is critically important for PPHM.
Furthermore, H nm can be expressed by utilizing H nm and S and shown in Eq. (21) .
where ε H nm denotes the accumulated error of the Hahn moments for a digital image f (x, y) function. Based on Eq. (21), the plaintext Hahn moments can be obtained with H nm = H nm S. For the upper bound U H , we will give a detailed analysis in the following. In order to get S and U H , we will introduce a quantization error in Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), respectively. Firstly, the weighted Hahn polynomials in Eq. (16) 
Let U f denote the upper bound of f (x, y), 1 we then have Eq. (25) [13] .
Finally, we can deduce an upper bound U H of the H nm by using Eq. (25) 
, where · represents the floor function. 
VI. PPIR: IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION IN THE ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
Image reconstruction refers to recovering the entire image from a known portion of image in the time domain or in the transform domain; or using part of the image value to represent the entire image to achieve the purpose of image compression. Since the performance of the Hahn moments can be directly reflected by the contrast between the reconstructed image and the original image. Image reconstruction in the encrypted domain will be discussed in order to further demonstrate the effectiveness of PPHM, named PrivacyPreserving Image Reconstruction (PPIR). Similar to PPHM, all the algorithm parameters in PPIR must be converted to integers using a quantization process. We construct a basic framework for PPIR and give an analysis of the upper bound of plaintext image reconstruction because the number field in the plaintext domain has been changed.
A. INTEGER APPROXIMATION AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION
In this subsection, we will give a specific implementation process of PPIR. In order to perform PPIR, some suitable integers should be obtained by quantifying the weighted Hahn polynomials h n and h m . It is worth noticing that the same quantization factor Q is used in the calculation of PPHM and PPIR for convenience. Then, the quantized weighted Hahn polynomial can be expressed with Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) .
According to the above analysis, if all of Hahn moments up to a given order (L + R) are computed, then the discrete image can be estimated by using Eq. (28) .
And then the Eq.(28) can be implemented in the encrypted domain with Eq. (29) .
In Figure. 4, we show the process of PPIR implementation by using the (n + m)-th order PPHM.
B. ACCUMULATED ERROR AND UPPER BOUND
Before calculating the reconstructed image f (x, y) with Eq. (29), we must ensure a one-to-one mapping relationship between f (x, y) and f (x, y) mod t, so that an upper bound U f of the reconstructed image f (x, y) can satisfy U f + 1 ≤ t. Furthermore, f (x, y) can be obtained with Eq. (30) .
In order to get U f , we will introduce a quantization error εh n and εh m in Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) , respectively. Therefore, the weighted Hahn polynomials in Eq. (26) Substituting Eq. (22) into Eq. (28), we can obtain f (x, y) with Eq. (31) .
Next, f (x, y) can be expressed with f (x, y) = S˜f f (x, y) + εf , and S˜f and εf can be deduced and shown in Eq.(32) and Eq.(33), respectively. 
where Q = 2Q 3 + 
Finally, we can abtain U f = Q 4 XY U f + QLRXY U f from Eq.(35).
VII. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis to demonstrate the computational complexity and security analysis of PPHM and PPIR in detail.
A. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the computational complexity of the proposed PPHM and PPIR will be investigated in detail. Note that three parameters, the properties of the homomorphic cryptosystem, homomorphic cryptosystem parameters and the image size, will have an immediate impact on the complexity of PPHM. Generally speaking, the properties of the homomorphic cryptosystem determine the type of algebraic operations in the encrypted domain. In addition, different homomorphic cryptographic parameters will also lead to different computational costs of algebraic operations. 2 And the size of image will also have a significant impact on the type of algebraic operations.
Note that the calculation of Hahn moments only involves addition and multiplication operations, which can be achieved by SHE scheme.
In other words, only modular addition operations and modular multiplication operations are necessary in the encrypted domain. Consequently, the complexity can be estimated as the number of modular additions and modular multiplications. Next, we will give a detailed analysis.
Firstly, we will concretely consider the complexity of the Hahn moments. Given a digital image f (x, y) with size X × X , any one order Hahn moment can be calculated by using X 2 multiplications and X 2 − 1 additions. Therefore, obtaining one order PPHM takes 4X 2 modular multiplications and 4X 2 − 3 modular additions. If all of the PPHM up to a given order (L + R) are computed, we can then compute the number of modular multiplications as
. Similarly, we can derive the total number of modular additions as
. Combining Eq.(2), the total number of modular multiplications and modular additions can be computed as 4X 2 (R + 1) (L + 1) + 3 and 4X 2 − 3 (R + 1) (L + 1) + 2, respectively. If user wants to reconstruct image from the entire set of the PPHM, then the total number of modular multiplications is 4X 4 + 3, and the total number of modular additions is (4X 2 − 3)X 2 + 2. Secondly, our purpose in this subsection is to analyze the complexity of the PPIR. Since the computation of the PPIR is the inverse process of the PPHM, and we consider that (L + R) order PPHM completed on the encrypted image. The PPIR can be implemented by using 6X 2 modular multiplications and 6X 2 − 4 modular additions. If all of the PPHM up to a given order (L + R) are computed, then we can compute the total number of modular multiplications as
. Finally, combining with Eq.(2), the total number of modular multiplications and modular additions can be computed as 6X 2 
respectively. If user wants to reconstruct image from the entire set of the PPHM, then the total number of modular multiplications is 6X 4 + 6, and the total number of modular additions is 6X 4 − 4X 2 + 3. It should be noted that the re-linearization is not utilized in the scheme. On the one hand, re-linearization reduces the size of the ciphertext to two ring elements, but increases the cost of the key generation and the time for homomorphic multiplication [25] . On the other hand, the proposed PPIR scheme has only two multiplications for each pixel. Therefore, the scheme without re-linearization can be much faster than the scheme with re-linearization.
In order to better demonstrate the superiority of PPHM scheme, we will compare it with DCT [24] and DWT in the encrypted domain [22] in the following.
For one thing, we give a conversion of operations between plaintext and ciphertext in different cryptosystems because different schemes use different cryptosystems. Specifically, each addition in the plaintext domain will be converted to a modular multiplication in the Paillier domain; each addition in the plaintext domain, however, will be converted to 2 modular additions in the SHE domain. And each multiplication in the plaintext domain will be converted to a modular exponentiation in the Paillier domain; each multiplication in the plaintext domain, however, will be converted to 4 modular multiplications and one modular addition in the SHE domain. For each subtraction in the plaintext domain will be converted to one modular inversion and one modular multiplication in the Paillier domain; each subtraction in the plaintext domain will be converted to 2 modular additions in the SHE domain (First, a negative number can be converted to a positive number by using mod t operation, and then the positive number will be encrypted by using Eq. (1)). Based on the aforementioned analysis, we can know that SHE used in the proposed scheme is more efficient.
For another, refering to [22] and [24] , complexity for the three different schemes can be obtained and listed in Table 1 (L + 1) (R + 1) X 2 modular inversions. From the above analysis, we can conclude that the computational complexity of PPHM is less than those of DWT and DCT schemes. Although PPHM spends a relatively more number of modular multiplication, PPHM takes a large number of faster modular additions instead of more VOLUME 6, 2018 time-consuming modular multiplications and modulo additions in DWT/DCT.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, security analysis of PPHM scheme is provided. Since each image pixel value is encrypted by using SHE scheme based on the ''ring learning with errors'' (RLWE) assumption of Lyubashevsky et al. [26] , which is described as follows.
Suppose that f (x) ∈ Z[x] be an integer polynomial of degree n, the ring R = Z[x]/ f (x) , q ∈ Z be a prime integer, χ represents an error distribution over R. The RLWE f ,q,χ assumption claims that for any polynomial samples of the form (a i , b i = a i s + e i ) ∈ R q × R q , where e i ∈ χ and (a i , s) ∈ UniR(R q × R q ), UniR denotes uniform random, and b i 's are computationally indistinguishable from uniform in R q . From [26] and [27] , it's not hard to see that the secret sampled from χ and the secret sampled from R q are equivalent.
The RLWE assumption has been proved to be hard on the ideal lattices in [26] , [28] , and [29] . Specifically, if there is an effective algorithm to solve RLWE problem, then there will be a quantum algorithm that solves the short vector problem (SVP) [30] on ideal lattices under the worst-case.
It is universally acknowledged that short vector problem is exponentially hard [25] . In other words, there does not exist a polynomial time adversary A that can solve the RLWE problem with a non-negligible advantage. Hence, the SHE scheme is semantically security [31] , [32] , that is, knowing any ciphertext E[f (x, y)] of unknown image pixel value f (x, y) does not disclose any material information about the image pixel value f (x, y). It should be noted that it is not realistic for the cloud server to use brute force methods to obtain the original image. For example, for a 256-level gray-scale image with size 256 × 256, the server must use 256 256×256 operations to get the original image, which is not feasible in actual scenarios.
In addition, the cloud server cannot obtain any information about the image content by using the proposed scheme. On the one hand, the cloud server only receives the encrypted image data E[f (x, y)] from the user's side. On the other hand, no interactive algorithm or comparison algorithm is involved in the calculation of PPHM and PPIR. Therefore, the cloud server cannot obtain any relationship between the value of two pixels. 
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS
From the description of the Section 5, we can know that there is an error term between the PPHM and the plaintext Hahn moments since basis function of the plaintext Hahn moments is converted to an integer by the quantization process, and the magnitude of the error depends on the value of the scale factor Q. In other words, the accuracy of PPHM depends on the value of the scale factor Q. The value of PPHM is approximately equal to the value of the plaintext Hahn moments when the value of Q is large enough. Hence the value of the scale factor Q should be determined so that the performance of the PPHM processing the encrypted images can be similar to the plaintext Hahn moments. Therefore, the main goal of our experiment is to verify the numerical correctness of PPHM, recognition rate and computational cost of PPHM for the encrypted image. We describe them in three aspects, namely, the image reconstruction which uses a finite set of computed PPHM, recognition accuracy on two databases (i.e., the MNIST database 3 and the ORL Database of Faces 4 ), the computational complexity of PPHM. The comparison between PPHM and plaintext Hahn moments is performed in terms of image reconstruction in subsection 8.1 and recognition accuracy in subsection 8.2. Note that PPHM is not compared with other methods in the encrypted domain because the performance among different methods is similar in the encrypted domain and the plaintext domain when the value of scale factor Q is appropriate. Therefore, we only compare the performance between PPHM and plaintext Hahn moments in terms of image reconstruction in subsection 8.1 and recognition accuracy in subsection 8.2. Moreover, the suitable value of scaling factor Q which can provide guidance to users is specified for image reconstruction and image recognition, respectively. In subsection 8.3, the computational complexity of PPHM is discussed. In the following, t = 2 83 can be carefully selected based on the analysis of upper bound in Section V and Section VI. The simulation experiments are implemented on a personal computer (Intel(R) Core (TM) I5-4590, 3.30 GHz CPU and 4.00 GB memory) by using Matlab9.1.
A. IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION
The main goal of this experiment is to verify the numerical correctness of PPHM and determine a suitable scale factor Q so that the PPHM can obtain the similar reconstruction performance as the plaintext Hahn moments in this subsection. Next, the experiment further validates PPHM's ability as a global feature extraction mode and the local feature extraction mode based on this scale factor Q, and compares the performance between PPHM and plaintext Hahn moments. The image reconstruction experiment is divided into two parts. In the first part, the PPHM for global feature is addressed by setting α 1 = β 1 = α 2 = β 2 = 0. The second part, the PPHM for local feature is studied by setting {α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 } > 0. In the experiment, binary images and the set of gray-level images including Pepper, Lena, Baboon and Woman in CVG-UGR Image Database 5 are used as test images. The five different test images and their corresponding encrypted versions with the SHE scheme are shown in Figure. 5. In addition, the size of each binary image is 90 × 90, the size of each gray-level image is 64 × 64.
1) GLOBAL FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this experiment, the PPHM for global feature is discussed in detail for different contents, different formats, different sizes of encrypted images. We first provide an experiment to determine a suitable scale factor Q so as to the PPHM can achieve the similar reconstruction ability as the plaintext Hahn moments. Next, we provide an image reconstruction experiment to further verify the performance of PPHM and compare it with the plaintext Hahn moments.
Experiment 1:
We provide an image reconstruction experiment of the encrypted gray-level image Lena with N = 63 to select a suitable value of Q so that the PPHM can obtain the same reconstruction performance as the plaintext Hahn moments. It should be noted that in addition to visually measuring the performance of image reconstruction, the structural similarity (SSIM) index which is a tool to assess the quality of images is utilized as a measure of the image reconstruction [33] . The value of SSIM is between [−1, 1]. It means that the two images are the same on condition that the value of SSIM is 1. When Q is set as different values, the decryption version of reconstruction results and the corresponding value of SSIM are shown in Figure. 6 .
From Figure. 6, we notice that the quality of decryption version of reconstruction image is bad when the values of Q are small, at the same time the value of SSIM is also very small. When the value of Q increases from 2 2 to 2 5 , the quality of decryption version of reconstruction image can be improved rapidly, synthetically the value of SSIM increases rapidly. As Q increases further from 2 6 to 2 9 , the quality of decryption version of reconstruction results can be slowly improved, synchronously the growth of the value of SSIM is slow. Furthermore, the quality of decryption version of reconstruction results does not change in the visual sense if Q ≥ 2 10 , at the same time the value of SSIM is not increasing. Through the above analysis, we can choose a suitable scaling factor Q ≥ 2 10 in the following image reconstruction experiment. In the following, we pick Q = 2 10 .
Experiment 2: This experiment is implemented to further demonstrate the image reconstruction capability of the PPHM by using the proposed theoretical framework, and compare it with the plaintext Hahn moments. Theoretically, the decrypted reconstructed image is similar to the plaintext reconstructed image, so we only show the decrypted reconstructed image. In order to illustrate the performance of PPHM, we give the SSIM in the plaintext domain and the encrypted domain, respectively. Three gray-level images Baboon, Pepper and Woman are considered as test images. And the decryption version for resultant images reconstructed from PPHM up to order from 5 to 60 with 5 increments are displayed in Figure. 7, Figure. 9 and Figure. 10, respectively. In addition, Figure. 8 shows that SSIM of decrypted reconstruction results and plaintext reconstruction results.
From Figure. 7, Figure. 9 and Figure. 10, we can see that the PPHM can be used to reconstruct the gray-level image accurately. Furthermore, we can see, when the order N is very small, the decrypted reconstruction image can well represent the outline of the image since a small number of the PPHM are involved in image reconstruction; as the value of N increases, more details information of the decrypted reconstruction image can be retained due to the increasing of the PPHM number; as the value of N increases further, the quality of decryption version of reconstruction image can be slowly improved; while the value of N is too big, decryption reconstruction image is nearly similar to the plaintext image. From the above analysis, we can see that PPIR are exactly the same as the reconstruction of Hahn moments in the plaintext domain. Furthermore, Figure. 8 shows that SSIM for the decrypted reconstruction results and plaintext reconstruction results of the gray-level image is almost the same, which causes some curves overlap. This result further indicates that PPHM and PPIR are effective for encrypted gray-level image processing.
In order to make the proposed scheme more convincing for images of various formats, we also give the reconstruction results of binary image of size 90×90, the decryption version for resultant images reconstructed from PPHM up to order from 5 to 60 with 5 increments as shown in Figure. 11.
From Figure. 11, the result shows the overall outline of the image while the order N is relatively small; as N increases, the basic shape of binary image can be well represented due to the increasing number of PPHM involved in binary image reconstruction; when N is 30, the result is very similar to the original image. These observations are exactly the same as the reconstruction of Hahn moments in the plaintext domain. In addition, from Figure. Through the above analysis, we can draw the conclusion that the proposed PPHM as a global feature extraction is effective for the encrypted images with different content, formats and sizes.
2) LOCAL FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this experiment, the PPHM for local feature can be used to capture the local information of the encrypted image. We provide an image reconstruction experiment to further verify the performance of PPHM and compare it with the plaintext Hahn moments. The binary image including four different aircrafts is used as test image. Here, the Q selected in the previous section still applies to local feature extraction, namely Q = 2 10 .
To be specific, the PPHM for local feature can be computed from the encrypted binary image. Then, the calculated PPHM is utilized to reconstruct the original image. The decryption version of the reconstruction images from the proposed moments up to order 10 are displayed in Figure. 12. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that SSIM of decrypted reconstruction results and plaintext reconstruction results.
From Figure. 12, the local information of the encrypted image will be represented in the lower orders if the parameters can be set reasonably. More specifically, the reconstruction begins from upper-left corner of an encrypted image under the condition of α 1 = 250, β 1 = 750, α 2 = 250, β 2 = 750, when the order is up to 10, and upper-left corner sub-image of an encrypted image can be reconstructed perfectly from the PPHM. The reconstruction begins from upper-right corner of an encrypted image if α 1 = 250, β 1 = 750, α 2 = 750, β 2 = 250, and upper-left corner sub-image of an encrypted image can be reconstructed admirably while the order up to 10. Moreover, from Table 2 we can know that SSIM for the decrypted reconstruction results and plaintext reconstruction results of the binary image is approximately the same. Through the aforementioned analysis, we can conclude that PPHM as local feature extraction is effective for the encrypted images.
To the point, the proposed PPHM can only emphasize the limited local region of the encrypted image. This allows us to flexibly describe the local features of the encrypted image based on actual demands. The properties of the PPHM are very useful when the image consumer wants to get a specified part of the image information instead of the entire image. For example, users will encrypt their own images and store them onto the cloud. When the user only needs to use the information in the upper-left corner of the encrypted image, the cloud should be able to provide such service to satisfy the user's demands. From the above analysis, it can be noted that the proposed PPHM is very meaningful for processing the encrypted image.
B. OBJECT RECOGNITION
In this subsection, we provide an object recognition experiment to evaluate the recognition rate of the PPHM compared with the plaintext Hahn moments. In addition, we pick α 1 = β 1 = α 2 = β 2 = 0 in this subsection. Two typical databases are used in object recognition experiments, namely the MNIST database of handwritten digits created by National Institute of Standards and Technology and the ORL Database of Faces. For the recognition task of the encrypted images, the PPHM up to order N is used as features with different values of the scale factor Q. In order to compare the recognition rate between PPHM and plaintext Hahn moments, the Hahn moments up to order N are used as features for the recognition task of the plaintext images. Furthermore, different value ranges for the scale factor Q are recommended for the encrypted handwritten digits image recognition task and the encrypted face image recognition task, respectively. Besides, the Euclidean distance between the feature vectors of two images is used as a measure of classification and is defined as
where H s denotes the P-dimensional feature vector of a test sample, and H
(k)
v represents the train vector of class k.
1) HANDWRITTEN DIGITS IMAGE RECOGNITION
This experiment is conducted to test the classification rate of the PPHM on handwritten digits images with different values of the scale factor Q, and comparing the recognition rate between the PPHM and the plaintext Hahn moments. The MNIST database of handwritten digits contains 70,000 of handwritten numerals (10 classes, and 7,000 images per class) with size 28 × 28, which includes 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing images. Typical images from the dataset are shown in Figure. 13. In this experiment, only 2000 training images and 10,000 testing images are selected to complete the object recognition task. When the value of scaling factor Q is determined, the PPHM with different values of order N are calculated from the encrypted handwritten digits images and considered as features. Furthermore, we set N ∈ [0 − 15], and the value of Q from 2 0 to 2 8 with 2 1 increment. The corresponding correct classification percentages (CCPs) are summarized in Figure. 14.
From the results shown in Figure. 14, the correct classification percentage is very low when Q = 2 0 and Q = 2 1 ; the correct classification percentage gradually increases with the increase of order N on condition that Q ≥ 2 2 . Moreover, the correct classification percentage of the PPHM and the plaintext Hahn moments (HM) have almost the same performance. Therefore, the PPHM could be useful as descriptor for the encrypted handwritten digits image recognition task. Finally, we recommend Q ≥ 2 2 for the encrypted handwritten digits image recognition task.
2) FACE IMAGE RECOGNITION
In this subsection, we conduct experiments to verify the classification performance of the proposed PPHM on face images with different values of the scale factor Q, and the recognition rate between the PPHM and the plaintext Hahn moments are compared. The Database of Faces (formerly ''The ORL Database of Faces'') contains 400 face images of 40 distinct subjects with size 92 × 112. For some subjects, the images are taken at different times, varying the lighting, facial expressions (open/closed eyes, smiling/not smiling) and facial details (glasses/no glasses). Typical images from the dataset are shown in Figure. 15. Note that some images are quite similar. In this experiment, only 60 (the first 3 different images of each of the first 20 distinct subjects) training images and 140 (the remaining 7 different images of each of the first 20 distinct subjects) testing images are selected to complete the object recognition task. When the value of scaling factor Q is determined, the PPHM with different values of order N are calculated from the encrypted face images and considered as feature. Furthermore, we set N ∈ [4−15] , and the value of Q from 2 0 to 2 8 with 2 1 increment. The corresponding correct classification percentages (CCPs) are summarized in Table 3 .
From the results shown in Table 3 , the correct classification percentage is very low when Q = 2 0 , Q = 2 1 and Q = 2 2 ; the correct classification percentage is gradually increased with the increase of order N while Q ≥ 2 3 . Moreover, the PPHM and HM almost have the same performance in terms of face image recognition in case that Q ≥ 2 6 . Therefore, the PPHM is useful as descriptors for the encrypted face image recognition task. Note that small fluctuations which do not affect the overall trend of the CCPs are normal. In addition, compared with handwritten digits image recognition experiments, we can notice that the more the number of the PPHM is needed to achieve better recognition performance on the database of faces. The reason is that the images in the database of faces are more similar and contain richer information than handwritten digit images. Finally, we recommend Q ≥ 2 6 for the encrypted face image recognition.
3) COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITIES
The objective of this experiment is to test the computational costs of the PPHM. The gray-level image Lena in Figure. in the encrypted domain due to the different construction mechanisms of DWT and PPHM. Figure. 16 shows the computational overhead for PPHM and DCT in the encrypted domain with orders varying from 0 to 7 when Q = 2 10 . It can be seen from the Figure. 16 that the computational overhead of PPHM and DCT increases with the order for images of different sizes. In addition, the computational time of PPHM with the same order is much less than that of the computational time of DCT in the encrypted domain for the same image. Therefore, PPHM performs better than DCT in the encrypted domain in terms of computational complexity.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a novel feature descriptor named PPHM for the encrypted cloud image processing. Moreover, we also proposed a novel framework for the PPHM. First, our scheme had a better image reconstruction performance in encrypted image field with suitable scaling factor. Second, experimental results demonstrated that the PPHM perform better in terms of the encrypted handwritten digits image recognition task and the encrypted face image recognition task by using suitable scaling factor, respectively. In addition, we also provide an exhaustive analysis on the computational complexity and security of PPHM scheme and showed that PPHM scheme had lower complexity and higher security compared with the existing works.
Future works will focus on two aspects. One is to further improve the performance of PPHM scheme. Additionally, we will consider the secure k-nearest neighbor query over encrypted data so that the PPHM can be used to implement secure content-based image retrieval.
